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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this guide is to provide background information on the ethnic Chinese refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos that will be of interest and use to educators working with these refugees. The guide consists of four sections: (1) a brief history of the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia; (2) a more detailed discussion of the Chinese in Vietnam, and the events leading to the massive exodus of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam in the spring and summer of 1979; (3) an account of education in the Chinese communities in Indochina, and the ramifications for education for the ethnic Chinese refugees in the U.S.; and (4) a brief, annotated bibliography of books and articles on the subject. (Author)

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Indochinese Refugee Education Guides

General Information Series #22

Background Information on the Ethnic Chinese Refugees

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The purpose of this Guide is to provide background information on the ethnic Chinese refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos that will be of interest and use to Educators working with these refugees. The Guide consists of four sections: first, a brief history of the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia; second, a more detailed discussion of the Chinese in Vietnam, and the events leading to the massive exodus of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam in the spring and summer of 1979; third, an account of education in the Chinese communities in Indochina, and the ramifications for education for the ethnic Chinese refugees here; fourth, a brief, annotated bibliography of books and articles on the subject.

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I. The Ethnic Chinese Communities in Southeast Asia

In this section, we will briefly sketch the history of Chinese migrations into Southeast Asia, and discuss some of the general characteristics of the ethnic Chinese communities. As you will notice from the number of quotes, and from the number of entries in the bibliography on page 40, a great deal has been written about the Chinese in Southeast Asia, and much of it is readily available. This section is correspondingly intended as an introduction or an overview, and we urge you to look into further references.

A. Chinese migrations into Southeast Asia

There have been Chinese in Southeast Asia for centuries. As early as the second century B.C., Chinese soldiers, merchants, and craftsmen were moving overland into what are now North and Central Vietnam and Cambodia. As the Chinese developed in shipbuilding and navigation, they ventured farther and farther into the South China Sea, developing contacts and gradually establishing a commercial empire [illegible] time westerners arrived [illegible] e early 1600's, the Chi[illegible] small but strong settl[illegible] [illegible]n of the countries involved. Between then and the middle of the n[illegible] century, these footholds grew in parallel with the developing economies of the countries, and with their contacts with western commercial powers.

Starting in the mid-1800's, colonization of Southeast Asia by western powers - i.e. France, in the case of Indochina - resulted in the development of a type of society in which the ethnic Chinese, by virtue of their already-established presence and their commercial abilities, more or less became the middlemen, forming an indispensible link between the western administrators and the indigenous populations.

The economic opportunities afforded by European colonization, coupled with natural pressures to leave China (overpopulation, disasters like floods and famines, and political pressures), produced a tremendous wave of Chinese immigration into Southeast Asia between 1860 and 1930. (This was the time of Chinese immigration to the West Coast of the United States, as well - at least until 1882, when the U.S. cut off immigration from China.) The Chinese population in South Vietnam, for example, went from an estimated 56,000 in 1860 to about four times that - an estimated 205,000 in 1931. (Purcell 1965)

By all accounts, the Chinese who emigrated to Southeast Asia during the colonial period did so intending to make a fortune and go home to China. Many of them did go home (with or without the fortune), as is shown by arrival and departure figures. Residence in Southeast Asia was therefore a temporary matter; there was no reason to become involved in local concerns other than economic. Even the Chinese who wound up permanently resettling in Southeast Asia maintained their "Chineseness," keeping a distance between themselves and the indigenous peoples.

An important aspect of the temporary nature of the Chinese sojourn in Southeast Asia was that the Chinese immigrant almost always left his family at home in China: very few women and children emigrated, especially in the early days. As might be expected, this led to a great number of marriages - temporary or otherwise - between Chinese men and indigenous women. The children of these marraiges had natural ties both to China and to the country in which they were born.

The question of the nationality of these children has been a source of contention between China and the Southeast Asian countries involved. Details have varied from country to country, but the basic question revolves around whether one's citizenship is determined by blood (i.e. you inherit your nationality from your father) or by place of birth (i.e. you belong to the country you were born in), and whether the individual has any choice in the matter.

As the flow of immigrants dried up in the third quarter of this century, the children of the mixed marriages grew up and had children of their own, and the composition of the Chinese communities shifted: the proportion of Chinese born in Southeast Asia

increased, and that of Chinese born in China decreased. China's official interest in its expatriate citizens also lessened - this was the time that the Peoples' Republic of China was in its infancy. Sources agree that in the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, there has been a loosening of ties to China, and a concomitant strengthening of ties to the host countries: the Chinese communities have become less like one another and China, and more like the cultures that surround them, especially in places like Cambodia where assimilation into the indigenous society has been encouraged by friendly relationships between it and its Chinese population.

B. Who is Ethnic Chinese?

One of the combined effects of assimilation to the host societies, and governmental difficulties over actual citizenship, has been to make it difficult to decide just who is ethnic Chinese and who isn't in Southeast Asia.

> Is a Chinese only a person born in China or at least a Chinese national? Is he someone whose mother tongue is Chinese or who meets an objective racial or cultural definition of 'Chineseness'? The 'Chinese minorities' in the Nanyang include many persons born outside China, holding citizenship papers of a Southeast Asian land, speaking little Chinese and reading less. Not a few so-called 'Chinese' adhere to family and religious practices which differ markedly from those on the mainland, both past and present, and some are visibly of mixed Chinese-Southeast Asian parentage. Yet, however inadequately they meet objective criteria of 'Chineseness', these persons regard themselves to be Chinese and are so regarded by other residents of their host country. (Heidhues 1974, pp. 2-3)

Ethnic "Chineseness," then, seems to be mostly a matter of self-identification. Certainly, among the ethnic Chinese refugees there is a wide, wide range: some speak and read only Chinese, whereas others speak and read only Vietnamese, Lao or Khmer; some have recognizable Chinese names, whereas others' names are indistinguishable from other refugee groups'; some feel a strong identification with Chinese communities in the United States, whereas others identify with their Vietnamese, Lao or Cambodian countrymen.

However difficult it is to determine who is and who isn't ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, it is important to have a rough idea of their numbers. In the following table, taken from Heidhues 1974, we reproduce the 1970 estimates of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos (from which the ethnic Chinese refugees have fled), and also for the countries the refugee camps are in.

Country	Total Chinese	Total Population	Percentage of Chinese
Vietnam	1,408,000	39,207,000	3.6
Cambodia	435,000	6,701,000	6.4
Laos	58,000	2,893,000	2.0
Indonesia	3,100,000	117,000,000	2.6
West Malaysia	3,250,000	9,000,000	36.1
East Malaysia	455,000	1,581,000	28.1
Philippines	520,000	37,158,000	1.4
Singapore	1,500,000	2,017,000	74.5
Thailand	3,400,000	34,738,000	10.0

C. Origins of the Chinese Immigrants into Southeast Asia

Virtually all emigration from China was from the three southeasternmost provinces of Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Fukien. People in these provinces and others in China speak one or another of the easily-identified dialects of Chinese. These dialects are often sufficiently different from one another to be in effect separate languages; the Chinese are often referred to as members of one or another speech-group, and these speech-groups are determined by the dialect the individual speaks at home.



Reproduced from Heidhues 1974, p.1

The map on page 5 shows the geographical position of the provinces from which the Chinese immigrated into Southeast Asia, and also the distribution of the speech-groups from which the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia were drawn.

Members of the different speech groups tended to gravitate towards different pursuits when they emigrated to Southeast Asia. The pepper-growers in Cambodia, for example, originated on Hainan, whereas the Chinese community in Phnom Penh was almost entirely Cantonese, and the rural Chinese shopkeepers and moneylenders were Teochiu. In South Vietnam, the economically crucial rice-processing concerns were largely in the hands of Hokkiens at one point. And so on. Of course, these speech-group specializations tended to disappear as immigration dried up, and as education and other factors opened up professions and other careers to young ethnic Chinese; even so, traces of the specializations can still be seen.

In general, the ethnic Chinese excelled in trade, both small-scale and large-scale. One of the reasons they were - and still are - able to do so is that they have traditionally maintained close commercial, financial and familial ties with mainland China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore.

D. Modern problems

After the Second World War, feelings of nationalism and a drive to independence became dominant forces in the Southeast Asian countries. Along with these feelings came resentment of the economic power the Chinese communities enjoyed, and attempts to curtail this power in one way or another. These attempts centered mostly around two strategies: first, to hasten the naturalization of the ethnic Chinese (which was supposed to lead to assimilation), and second, to one way or another block Chinese participation in the economic activities from which they derived their power.

Another source of resentment was the feeling that the ethnic Chinese political loyalties lay, not with the newly-developing countries, but with mainland China or Taiwan. Many of the movements to hasten or enforce citizenship of the ethnic Chinese can be traced to the notion that with citizenship-on-paper comes automatic loyalty.

Movements along these lines varied from country to country. Laos never attracted enough Chinese for their numbers to make them a threat. In Cambodia, relations between the Cambodians and the resident Chinese had always been relatively friendly; the Chinese have never, seemingly, balked at the notion of assuming Cambodian citizenship. In Malaysia, on the other hand, the Chinese have been seen

as a real threat - and this is reflected in Malaysian policy towards the "boat people," who were until July of 1979 mostly ethnic Chinese. And in Vietnam, as we will discuss in more detail in the next section, movements to curtail the Chinese ultimately resulted in their mass expulsion from the country.

E. The Chinese language(s)

The ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, as we mentioned before, speak one or the other of the Chinese dialects listed on page : Cantonese, Teochiu, Hokkien, Hakka, or Hainanese. (We should warn you that the names of each of these dialects are spelled in any number of ways in the literature.) These dialects differ from one another mostly in pronunciation and vocabulary, and sometimes differ sufficiently to be mutually unintelligible. (Y. R. Chao, who is probably the best-known Chinese linguist, writing in English, estimates that some of the dialects of Chinese differ from other dialects as much as, say, French differs from Italian.)

The dialects of Chinese mentioned in the previous paragraph are "home" languages used most often in informal social and business situations and, of course, around the house. In educated circles, and certainly in Chinese schools, the prestige dialect of Chinese - called Mandarin or, more modernly, kuo-yu is used. Mandarin is roughly the Chinese spoken in Peking; it has, for some time, been accepted as the standard language all over mainland China, on Taiwan, and in the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia.

Besides being the accepted standard dialect, Mandarin also functions, in the overseas Chinese communities, as a means of communication - technically a lingua franca - among Chinese whose "home" dialects aren't mutually understandable. All of this is reflected in the large numbers of ethnic Chinese refugees who speak Mandarin Chinese in addition to their native dialect, and use it in everyday situations. For many younger ethnic Chinese refugees who have had extensive education in Chinese schools, it is the dialect they are most comfortable using.

As might be expected of a minority group, the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia speak the language of the country they are living in, depending on their contacts with native speakers and on the extent to which they have "assimilated." There are ethnic Chinese from Vietnam, for example, whose Chinese is a little shaky, and whose Vietnamese is flawless; there are also ethnic Chinese from Vietnam who speak no Vietnamese at all (these tend to be the rural farmers, and fishermen).

II. The Ethnic Chinese in Vietnam

A. Early contacts

As we mentioned earlier, the Chinese have been moving about in Vietnam since the second century B.C., and for the next thousand years thoroughly dominated Vietnamese culture. The Chinese occupation did not, however, lessen the Vietnamese sense of nationality, or patriotism:

> "Although the Annamite Vietnamese people were thoroughly sinicized in their beliefs, their habits, and their general cultural patterns, they did not surrender to the invader their sense of being a people distinct and apart. Annam is full of pagodas and temples erected in honour of heroes who had resisted the Chinese invaders or the Chinese pirates from the south." (Purcell 1965, p. 208)

Throughout the middle ages, China enjoyed brisk trading relations with Vietnam. In the sixteenth century, the town of Faifoo was founded by the Chinese in what is now Central Vietnam; Faifoo was the commercial center of the area for the next two centuries. The Vietnamese traded raw and processed silk, [illegible]wood, eagle wood, sugar, musk, cinnamon, pepper, rice, gold, ivory, areca [illegible], woods for dyeing, [illegible] fish, birds' nests, and rhinoceros horns; the Chinese traded brass, tea, porcelain, raw silk, drugs and medicine, paper, paintings and cloth. (Purcell 1965)

In 1778, the Chinese formed a village several miles away from Saigon, on the Dong Nai River; this village, called Cholon by the Vietnamese, grew with Saigon to become the center of Vietnamese economy. In 1889, there were an estimated 56,000 Chinese nationals in South Vietnam, 23,000 of whom were located in Saigon-Cholon.

B. The French colonial period

By the 1890's, the French were in control of all of Indochina. Vietnam was governed not as a whole, but in three regions: Tonkin (North Vietnam), Annam (Central Vietnam), and Cochinchina (South Vietnam). The lifestyle that evolved with the French regime generated an increased demand for imports, and an increased use of money and therefore banking services. This was an attractive climate for merchants and traders, and the Chinese, who already had a foothold there, flocked to the area to do business, especially to Cochinchina. In 1906, the Chinese population in Vietnam was estimated at 120,000, more than twice the figure for 1889; in 1921, the estimate had jumped to around 200,000. (Nguyen 1967, p. 18)

The French originally thought that the agricultural scene in Indochina would be improved by the services of Chinese coolies, but the Chinese for the most part thought otherwise, preferring to be fishermen (large numbers of Chinese lived on junks) or artisans: tailors, shoemakers, joiners, makers of boxes and baskets, glass-blowers, and so on. (Purcell 1965, p. 194)

> But in trade, and in all its forms and ramifications as distinguished from industry, the Chinese found himself in his element. To begin with, he had at his disposal the network of guild and co-operative organizations which enabled him to work with his eyes and ears open and with the mutual assistance of his fellows and competitors....No cultural gulf yawned between him and the Indochinese: they were...very similar to him in temperament and attitude of mind. It was this...which gave the Chinese a big advantage over the European merchant. He could live as the native did, or on a slightly higher level; he was entirely acclimatized in the country which adjoined his own, and he did not require the standards of hygiene and comfort indispensable to the European; he learned languages readily and gained an understanding of local psychology which, although less refined and developed than his own, was nevertheless similar in character; he never experienced the feeling of misunderstanding or basic incompatibility which so often overwhelmed the European in dealing with native behavior and reactions. Because the Chinese understood the native, he was better able to gain the latter's confidence and, for the same reason, could deceive him more easily.... (Purcell 1965, p. 195)

The Chinese quickly came to dominate the rice trade in Cochinchina. The Vietnamese farmer with a surplus of rice rarely had the facilities to ship, store or process it; independent Chinese merchants bought the harvested rice paddy from him, and transported it via junks to other Chinese merchants in Saigon-Cholon, who processed, stored and exported it.

One of the by-products of this complicated process was a system of credit through which many Vietnamese peasants became hopelessly indebted to the Chinese middlemen, in a situation vaguely reminiscent of that of coal miners in Appalachia at the same time, who "owed their soul to the company store." Credit was extended to the Vietnamese throughout the year, with repayment at harvest time; but interest rates were so high that the Vietnamese never got out of debt.

While the economic climate in colonial Indochina offered the Chinese attractive opportunities, their official life seems to have been a constant series of petty and not-so-petty bureaucratic hassles, especially in the early days of the colony.

Chinese comings and goings were heavily monitored by the French:

> Regulations at the end of the century...compelled the incoming Asiatic to go to the capital, register at the Bureau of Immigration, accept a place in one or other of the groups recognized by the Government, obtain a travelling certificate, have his permis de sejour renewed each year, and when he departed to receive a passport... (Purcell 1965, p. 188)

And there was a special tax on the Chinese. They were categorized according to earning power, and required to pay a yearly tax, the amount of which was determined by the category they were in. Proceeds from this tax made up about a quarter of the total the government collected; the tax was popular with both the French and the Vietnamese:

> The budget takes from the Chinese tax a sum of about two million piastres per year. If the Celestial immigrants did not pay them, the Annamites Vietnamese would be obliged to make up the deficit, which fact would create in our country a sentiment unfavorable to the good relations between China and Annam. This would be regrettable... (from L'Asie Francaise, April 1929, quoted in Nguyen 1967, p. 32)

There were some aspects of official life that were favorable to the Chinese. Before the French arrived, the Chinese community was organized into bangs -- one bang per speech-group, for a total of up to five in any geographical area. Leaders of the bangs were chosen by the Vietnamese authorities; the bangs were responsible for the behavior of members, for registration of immigration and emigration, and for tax collection. An immigrating Chinese individual was required to belong to the appropriate bang.

When the French established colonial rule, they allowed the overall bang organization to persist, changing the name to congregation. Membership in congregations, while it was required of Chinese immigrants, placed them apart from local society. The congregations had complete authority in the administration of schools, hospitals, cemeteries and temples for their members, as well as in legal disputes and bureaucratic affairs.

Another aspect of official life that operated in favor of the Chinese community was the "favored nation" status of Chinese nationals. In treaties between France and China in the 1880's, the position of Chinese nationals in Vietnam was spelled out along with commercial relationships between the two countries: the Chinese were to enjoy pretty much the same rights as French nationals. They could,

among other things, own land, build, open shops and other commercial establishments. The Vietnamese authorities countered some of these privileges by placing restrictions on all foreigners, such as denying possession of land in certain areas; since the vast, vast majority of the foreigners in Vietnam were Chinese, the restrictions were fairly specifically aimed at them. Nonetheless, the Chinese wound up enjoying some privileges that other foreigners didn't, thanks to their "favored nation" status. In addition, they were not subject to conscription into military service or into forced labor, whereas Vietnamese citizens were.

Throughout the colonial period, the actual citizenship of the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam was up in the air. The Chinese who emigrated to Vietnam - remember that they did so intending to return to China - were of course considered Chinese nationals by all involved. The nationality question arose over the status of the Minh-huong - individuals born in Vietnam whose fathers or mothers were Chinese nationals.

In 1909, the Chinese government passed a law claiming the Minh-huong and other children of mixed marriages in Southeast Asia as a whole as Chinese nationals. According to the law, an individual was a Chinese national, no matter where he was born, if his father or his mother was a Chinese national. In addition, an indigenous woman who married a Chinese national was also considered a Chinese national if the marriage was registered. (Nguyen 1967, p. 79) All of this was counter to the usual custom in the countries of Southeast Asia whereby a person born in a particular country had the right to citizenship in that country. The Minh-huong, then, were considered Chinese by China and Vietnamese by the Vietnamese, a state of affairs which persisted into the 1950's.

C. The 1930's and '40's

During the years of the World Depression, Chinese immigration into Vietnam dropped sharply; between 1931 and 1933, the number of Chinese returning to China was greater than the number coming into Vietnam. The Depression hit the rice industry:

> With one or two exceptions, the Chinese, who had a virtual monopoly of rice distilling, have disappeared; only one of every four of those who monopolized the sale and purchase of paddy are still in the colony, and nine out of every ten of those engaged in the sale of hardware and fabrics have gone... (Robequain, quoted in Purcell 1965, p. 199)

Later in the '30's, Chinese immigration figures were back up to the norms and beyond, but writers agree that the Chinese community had lost some of its economic

footing. The Vietnamese were becoming better educated, and could take jobs that earlier only the Chinese were capable of, and the French and Vietnamese were getting involved in the rice processing industry, providing hitherto non-existent competition.

Throughout most of the Second World War, Vietnam was in control of the Vichy French, who had arrangements with Japan involving Japanese occupation of bases in North and South Vietnam. Japan, of course, was fighting against China, and the Chinese community in Vietnam was naturally affected. Business seems to have boomed, however; Indochinese rice was in great demand.

When Japan surrendered in 1945, China was given control of Vietnam above the 16th parallel - all of North Vietnam and a good part of Central Vietnam. In re-establishing her rights to the territory, France made considerable concessions to China, one of which was that the Chinese in Vietnam were to continue enjoy the rights they had had before.

D. The Citizenship Issue

Between 1946 and 1954, Vietnam was at war with France for her independence. The Chinese community supplied both sides during the conflict; it was at the same time often caught in the cross-fire.

In 1954, the Geveva Convention split Vietnam in two: the communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the north, and the Republic of Vietnam in the south. Thousands of ethnic Chinese were among the refugees who fled from North to South Vietnam at the time; these tnousands, plus the immigrant flow from China which was still substantial, plus the increasing numbers of Minh-huongs, pushed the number of Chinese in South Vietnam close to a million, constituting about 7 per cent of the total population. Economically, they held far, far more power: an estimated eighty per cent of the retail trade, for example, was in their hands. (Fall 1958, p. 65)

The new government of South Vietnam considered the Chinese presence a real threat, and quickly took steps to speed up assimilation - or at least naturalization - of the Chinese into Vietnamese society, and to break the hammerlock the Chinese community had on the economy.

In August, 1956, the government issued an ordinance which denied the legitimacy of Chinese citizenship for the Minh-huong, and conferred automatic citizenship on all ethnic Chinese born in Vietnam. The ordinance also required the Chinese to Vietnamese-ize their names, which seems to have been a matter of substituting Vietnamese sounds for Chinese sounds. (The Chinese family name Wang, for example, was

changed to Hoang or Huynh, already existing Vietnamese family names; Chinese Chen was changed to Vietnamese Tran, and so on.)

Two weeks later, the government issued another ordinance, this one barring non-Vietnamese nationals from eleven professions, notably rice processing, ownership of small grocery stores, transportation, and commission agents.

Ethnic Chinese response to the ordinance imposing Vietnamese citizenship on them was disobedience. They were supposed to turn in their Chinese identification cards and be issued new ones as Vietnamese citizens, and they simply didn't:

> Although the original deadline was set at May 9, 1957, by June 17 a total of only 3,500 Chinese, out of an estimated 600,000 had come forward for their identification cards, in spite of the fact that various local authorities, in their zeal, used coercive measures - from illegal fines to beatings and arrests - to compel the Chinese to take out Vietnamese citizenship. (Fall 1958, p. 67)

The Chinese Nationalist Government on Taiwan protested the citizenship ordinances on the grounds that the individuals involved were denied any choice in the matter, and offered asylum to any Chinese who wanted to leave Vietnam. The matter got to be a question of face - the U.S. was asked to intercede on both sides - and all in all the whole issue was left in an unfortunate deadlock, with the Vietnamese government unable to back down on the ordinance, and the ethnic Chinese refusing to comply with it.

Ultimately, however, most of the Chinese registered, as can be seen by the drop in the number of Chinese nationals from year to year. In December 1957, fifteen months after the issue of the ordinance, there were 373,442 Chinese nationals in South Vietnam; the number had dropped to 86,788 by December, 1958; and to 7,453 by December 1962. (Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam figures, quoted in Nguyen 1967)

Another ethnic Chinese response to the two ordinances was to withdraw funds from various banks, an immediate effect of which was to send the value of South Vietnamese currency down to an all-time low. A more far-reaching effect was that the entire economy of South Vietnam was badly shaken up, on all levels.

> The Chinese...represented much more than an important capital-holding group - they provided an economic distribution system which, on a more or less informal basis, connected South Viet-Nam with other countries of Southeast Asia...

Illustrative of this is an anecdote told by a U.S. State Department official who was in Vietnam at the time: he walked into a Chinese establishment in Saigon, handed over $200 in Vietnamese currency, and announced that he was going to Cambodia; a week later, he walked into a parallel establishment in Phnom Penh, told the (also Chinese) proprietor who he was; the proprietor said he had been expected, and promptly handed over $200 in Cambodian currency. Not one word had been written down in the transaction.

> The partial Chinese withdrawal from economic activities in South Viet-Nam pointed up one financial fact that had been hidden up to that point: that, thanks to the informality of Chinese business operations (which permitted the transfer of large sums or amounts of merchandise merely by a few words on the back of a business card), South Viet-Nam had been able to transact a fairly large amount of business on a relatively small monetary base. The combination of these two factors (the Chinese technique of distribution and the Chinese commercial network as an integral part of a regional economy) truly constituted the economic strength of the Chinese community in South Viet-Nam.... No amount of Vietnamese goodwill and government support could match it. (Fall 1958, p. 69-70)

By July, 1957, things had come to such a pass that the Vietnamese government was willing to give a little: Chinese storekeepers (the closing of whose shops had left hundreds of Vietnamese neighborhoods without a convenient source of supplies) were told they could reopen if they would take Vietnamese partners, Vietnamese citizenship, or Vietnamese wives in whose names the businesses could be registered. Later, Chinese nationals were allowed to own companies if at least 51 per cent was in the names of their children born in Vietnam.

The upshot of these concessions seems to have been that business which had hitherto been overtly in the hands of the Chinese community, remained in the hands of the Chinese community, but covertly, with Vietnamese nationals as fronts. This situation persisted until the fall of the South Vietnamese government in 1975.

The question of citizenship of the Minh Huong does not seem to have been so much of an issue in North Vietnam in the '50's and '60's. In 1955, North Vietnam and China reached an agreement - on paper, at any rate - that the ethnic Chinese in North Vietnam would be guided into gradually adopting Vietnamese nationality, on a voluntary basis. The North Vietnamese government would gradually assume responsibility for Chinese organizations, schools, newspapers, hospitals and social services for the Chinese like unemployement relief.

E. Vietnam and the ethnic Chinese after 1975.

After the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, the ethnic Chinese communities in Vietnam got caught in the middle of events which have resulted in their comprising a significant majority of the refugees fleeing Vietnam in recent years. First, as ethnic Chinese, they have naturally borne the brunt of deteriorating relations between Vietnam and China. Second, as the capitalist "middle class" of South Vietnam, they stood to lose the most as Hanoi instituted moves to de-capitalize, socialize, and nationalize the economic structure of Vietnam. And third, as holders of a sizable portion of the capital in the country, they have been the natural targets of a government beset on one side by natural disasters like floods and manmade disasters like invasions, and on the other hand by an economy in dire need of hard currency. These three factors have combined to make life difficult for the ethnic Chinese in both North and South Vietnam, and to make fleeing the country as refugees a continually viable alternative.

1. The citizenship issue revisited. As we mentioned in the previous section, there were differences in the treatment of ethnic Chinese between North and South Vietnam in the 1950's and 1960's: the Diem government of South Vietnam had forced Vietnamese naturalization on the ethnic Chinese, while the North Vietnamese government had left it as a matter of personal choice, expecting that most of the ethnic Chinese would opt for Vietnamese citizenship. After the fall of South Vietnam, it was expected that Hanoi's policy towards the ethnic Chinese - voluntary citizenship - would be extended to the ethnic Chinese in South Vietnam as well.

This was not the case. In early 1976, as part of the reunification of the two Vietnams, and in preparation for the national elections, the Hanoi government accepted without question the Vietnamese nationality of the ethnic Chinese who had been forced to nationalize under the Diem government, despite requests from many of them to get their Chinese citizenship back.

2. The socialization of the economy. At the same time as it was enforcing Vietnamese citizenship for the ethnic Chinese in the south, Hanoi was making plans for the elimination of capitalist trade, and the concomitant conversion of the (largely ethnic Chinese) middle class into farmers and workers. All this was part of the Five-Year Plan (1976-80) which was to see the restructuring of the Vietnamese economy. The Plan did not do so well the first two years: tensions between Vietnam and Kampuchea, the drought of 1977, and internal structural problems caused the implementation of the Plan to go much more slowly than had been hoped.

In March, 1978, the Vietnamese government implemented the first part of its plan to eliminate capitalist trade: it announced that the two currencies in North and South Vietnam were to be called in, and replaced with a single unified currency. This exchange involved the raiding of some 30,000 businesses in the Saigon-Cholon business area, and the confiscation of stock. Those who had been in trade could get their property back in the new currency, but only on approval from local government committees, and only for use in approved areas; in other words, businessmen had their capital confiscated, and were expected to become farmers or workers.

Writers are agreed that this move was a class-line move on the part of the Vietnamese government, and not a move against the ethnic Chinese per se. Of course, the ethnic Chinese, who constituted the majority of the businessmen and traders in South Vietnam, were most affected; but there were ethnic Chinese in other occupations whom the policy did not affect, and, conversely, ethnic Vietnamese in trade whom the policy did affect.

China interpreted this move not as a class-line move, but as one directed against the ethnic Chinese communities in Vietnam, and protested loudly, against both the seizure of property and (belatedly) the citizenship issue.

3. April 1978 - April 1979. Soon after the currency exchange move, in April and May of 1978, there was a massive exodus of ethnic Chinese from North Vietnam overland into China. The 150,000 who fled constituted about half the ethnic Chinese population of North Vietnam, and were by all accounts valuable people in terms of skills and abilities.

Why they fled is still unclear. Vietnam claimed that a Beijing-instigated rumor campaign (to the effect that the Vietnamese would conduct reprisals against the ethnic Chinese over the differences between Vietnam and China with regard to Kampuchea) frightened the ethnic Chinese into fleeing Vietnam. China claimed that the Vietnamese were "...unwarrantedly ostracizing and persecuting Chinese residents in Vietnam, and expelling many of them back to China." (On The Expulsion... 1978, p.1) Writers agree that neither claim makes much sense: it's hard to believe that a rumor campaign could cause so many people to pick up and move; likewise, it is hard to believe that Vietnam would deliberately expel people who were as crucial to its economy as the ethnic Chinese in the north were.

In any event, in June of 1978 China withdrew its program of aid to Vietnam, which had up to then amounted to about $300 million per year. This blow to the Vietnamese economy was followed by another in the shape of late summer floods, which inflicted massive damage on the season's crops. Late in 1978, Vietnam invaded Cam-

bodia. Then, in February 1979, China invaded North Vietnam.

All these events combined to result in a shift in Vietnam's policy towards its ethnic Chinese. Whereas before the ethnic Chinese had borne the major brunt of class-line policies, now the policies were aimed at ethnic Chinese whatever their class: the Vietnamese government apparently instituted moves to rid the country of the ethnic Chinese, whether these were businessmen, fishermen or farmers, capitalist or Communists.

4. The boat people. In the early summer of 1979, arrivals of Vietnamese refugees in countries like Malaysia and Thailand jumped astronomically from an average of about 6500 per month to ten times that. No one knows how many refugees set out from Vietnam but died at sea. These were, of course, the "boat people," who commanded so much attention on television and in the newspapers. 60 - 70 % of these refugees were ethnic Chinese: it is interesting that of all the interviews with refugees shown on the CBS Reports program on the boat people, the vast majority of the refugees interviewed were speaking Chinese.

Stories told by ethnic Chinese boat people indicate that the conditions under which they were allowed to leave Vietnam differed depending on whether they left North or South Vietnam.

After the Chinese invaded North Vietnam in February, the Vietnamese government established a policy whereby ethnic Chinese in the north - as possible or potential spies and "fifth columns" - were forced to choose between relocating from coastal and border areas to remote inland agricultural areas, or leaving the country. If they chose to leave, the government would assist their departure.

> ...these people organized themselves into groups to buy boats and arrange their departure. They say they were permitted to sell their belongings but that prices were often very low. Once ready to leave, they requested permission from security officials. On departure day, groups were escorted to the dock by police officials, and many people were apparently required to surrender identity papers and ration books. (Heibert 1979, p. 25)

According to the National Geographic's November 1979 article, the cost of one of these boats - a 60 ft. long, 15 ft. wide sailboat with rotting planking - was about $19,500. One hundred eighty-two people went together to buy the boat, for an average of $102.

Most of the ethnic Chinese fleeing from North Vietnam wind up in Hong Kong or South China. It cost a lot more to be a refugee in South Vietnam. The ethnic Chi-

nese in the south were not made to choose between relocating and leaving the country; their departures were still officially "illegal departures." They paid, nonetheless, between $1500 and $3000 apiece - in gold - to leave. While much of this went to buy the boats involved, it is not clear whether the rest went into the pockets of the organizers, or as bribes to local officials, or to the Vietnamese government on one level or another.

Wherever the money went, sources are agreed that the flow of refugees from South Vietnam was a boon to the Vietnamese economy:

> The refugee exodus, which was estimated by some analysts to earn the Vietnamese government $115 million in 1978, became the major source of foreign exchange for Vietnam. International banking sources in Hong Kong reported in mid-1979 that overseas Chinese, in efforts to help their relatives in Vietnam, remitted several hundred million dollars to the Bank of Vietnam in 1979. (Niehaus 1979, p. 145)

The Vietnamese government denied that it profited from the refugee exodus, and that it allowed or encouraged people to leave South Vietnam. On this latter point, there is a great deal of evidence that the government had considerable control over these "illegal departures"; the sudden shift in ethnicity of the Boat People, from largely ethnic Chinese before the Geneva convention in July 1979, to almost entirely ethnic Vietnamese after that, is in itself indicative of such control.

5. The Geneva Conference. As mentioned before, hundreds of thousands of refugees fled from Vietnam between March and July of 1979, most of whom were ethnic Chinese. International outcry over their plight resulted in a sixty-five nation conference in Geneva in July. (This was the meeting at which Vice-President Mondale pledged that the United States would take in 14,000 refugees a month for the indefinite future.) At this meeting, Hanoi pledged to take steps to curtail or stop the illegal departures for a reasonable period of time.

Immediately afterwards, the flow of refugees from Vietnam dropped from over 60,000 per month to 6,000 or 7,000, and has continued at that level until the present (April, 1980). The refugees leaving Vietnam since August, 1979, are almost all ethnic Vietnamese, indicating that something is happening to prevent the Chinese from leaving.

These 6,000 - 7,000 refugees per month are still "illegal departures". In addition to them, some Vietnamese citizens are allowed to leave Vietnam under the "orderly departure" program. This program operates according to an agreement reached by the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) and the Vietnamese governmen

whereby 10,000 persons a month would be allowed to leave Vietnam for work abroad or for family reunification. The people who would be allowed to leave are determined by their appearing both on a list compiled by the Vietnamese government, and on a similar list compiled by the receiving country and channeled through the UNHCR.

There have been problems implementing the orderly departure program; in the seven months following its establishment in May 1979, only nine hundred people have left Vietnam under its auspices. The major problem seems to be disagreement as to who leaves;

> While the United States and other nations were concerned with the thousands of family reunification cases, Hanoi appears to view the program as a means to allow unwanted citizens to leave the country. For example, a predominant number, if not all, of the 21,000 persons on the lists provided by Hanoi in October 1979 were ethnic Chinese. (Niehaus 1979, p. 149)

At the moment, then, the ethnic Chinese are not escaping from Vietnam, nor are they leaving through the orderly departure program, in any great numbers. There are, of course, thousands and thousands of ethnic Chinese refugees from Vietnam in the camps in Southeast Asia, particularly in Malaysia and Hong Kong. As the United States allows Indochinese refugees into the country at the rate of 14,000 per month, many of the refugees arriving now and in the months to come will be ethnic Chinese from Vietnam.

III. Education for the Ethnic Chinese in Indochina

In this section, we will give an account of education in the ethnic Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, and discuss the educational levels of the ethnic Chinese refugees.

A. Chinese schools

Education has traditionally been of highest value in Chinese culture; as the Chinese migrated into Southeast Asia over the centuries, a concern for education went with them. Early schooling - i.e. schooling up to the twentieth century - was informal in terms of sites and teachers (much of it was home tutoring or neighborhood classes), but was highly structured in terms of what was taught:

> The school course would consist in the first stage of committing to memory the canonical books and of writing an infinity of diversely formed characters as a mental exercise. In the second stage, the pupil would

> translate books into the colloquial language (i.e. 'reading') and he would have lessons in composition. In the third stage, there would be belles-lettres, literature and the composition of essays. Pupils learnt their lessons aloud (a feat of concentration when all the other pupils were doing the same thing with another book or a different part of the same book), and recited them when learnt with their backs to the teacher. There were no graduated classes; in fact, there were as many classes as there were pupils. The books would be the San Tzu Ching, or Trimetrical Classic (a work of A.D. 1050), then the Ch'ien Tzu Wen or Millenary Classic, the Odes for Children, the Canons of Filial Piety (Hsiao Ching), etc., and in due course the pupil would pass on to the Four Books, which, from the Sung Dynasty, comprised the Great Learning, the Doctrine of the Mean, the Analects, and Mencius. (Purcell 1965, p. 141)

Presumably, children of families involved in trade would get a good dose of mathematics and abacus practice, along with all this reading.

During the French colonial period, Chinese schools were the responsibility of the congregations; Chinese communities were free to open schools, and they did so with virtually no interference from the French. Schooling was more readily available to the ethnic Chinese child than to his indigenous counterpart, and it was in his native language; public education under the French was available to very few Indochinese, and it was in French. Many young ethnic Chinese men went abroad for advanced schooling - to Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan or mainland China - indicating that their education at home was extensive enough to enable them to think of competing with Chinese nationals.

The language in the schools run by the congregations was, naturally, the dialect of Chinese spoken by the members of the congregations (as we mentioned before, the congregations were organized along speech-group lines), and Mandarin. These schools were sometimes profit-making institutions within the communities, or community projects, per se.

In the absence of interest or control on the part of the French, the congregation schools were greatly influenced by developments in education in China. Moreover, China's interest in its expatriate communities naturally included an interest in the education of the children. So developments in ethnic Chinese schools reflected developments in education in mainland China and on Taiwan after 1950. They were subject to review by school inspectors from China. They were expected to use Mandarin as the language of instruction when Mandarin was established as the national language in China. They were expected to incorporate political teachings that were being taught in China. And they were expected to use teachers imported from the mainland and Taiwan.

During the 40's and 50's, interest in indigenous education skyrocketed along with the development of nationalism in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. The public school systems in these countries underwent more or less gradual shifts towards national goals, including the use of the national languages in instruction (first in the primary schools, then later in the secondary schools), and adjustments in curricula at all levels to be more in keeping with the needs of the children and the needs of the countries. As might be expected, the Chinese schools came to be regarded as factors inhibiting the assimilation of the Chinese into the indigenous societies; certainly the use of Chinese in instruction, the influence of China and Taiwan on the curricula, and the presence of teachers from China and Taiwan, reinforced the Chinese child's conception of himself as Chinese rather than as Vietnamese, Cambodian or Laotian.

The governments of the three countries correspondingly imposed restrictions on Chinese schools, ranging from outright closing of particular schools to restrictions on the use of Chinese, the content of the curricula, and so on. Even with restrictions, the number of Chinese schools increased dramatically after the Second World War, and after an apparent decline in the 50's, again in the early 60's. There are discrepancies between statistics on ethnic Chinese schools collected by government agencies, and similar statistics collected by writers sympathetic to the ethnic Chinese cause; whichever statistics one believes, however, it is clear that education has continued to be more widely available to ethnic Chinese children than it has been to ethnic Vietnamese, Cambodian and Lao children.

The need to go along with government restrictions on language and curricula, and the need to continue the "Chinese" education of the children, resulted in Chinese schools which offered bilingual education on a sophisticated level by anyone's standards;

> "All Chinese schools in Vietnam, for purposes of both survival (in an alien and nationalistics environment) and cultural self-preservation, are bilingual schools. In a few cases they are even trilingual, such as the Bac Ai School in Cholon with a curriculum taught in French, Vietnamese and Chinese, or The Gioi School also in Cholon which offered a curriculum taught in English, Vietnamese and Chinese. But for the most part, they are at least bilingual in a very real sense with half of the day or half of the courses taught in Vietnamese and half taught in Chinese. This is a bilingual maintenance program... which for obvious reasons makes heavy demands on the children: in the Saigon-Cholon schools the ratio of Vietnamese hours to Chinese is 17/16, adding up to 33 hours of classroom a week, and at the Tho Nhon School in Da Nang a week may represent as much as 39 hours of classroom work. The results, however, are extremely satisfactory as they

> produce truly, thoroughly bilingual persons. Not only are the students bilingual, they are also thoroughly bicultural as well since in some courses like Geography or History they may study Vietnamese history or geography in the morning and have to study Chinese history and geography in the afternoon." (Bich 1980, pp. 6-7)

To get a better idea of the kind of education recently available to the ethnic Chinese, we interviewed a young Chinese-Vietnamese refugee in the Washington, D.C. area, on his school experiences.

Mr. Quang Hang, twenty-one years old, was born in Qui Nhon, a town in South Vietnam. His father was born in China, on the island of Hainan; his mother, also of Hainanese parentage, was born in Vietnam. His father emigrated to Vietnam before 1945, and did so never intending to return to China. He kept his Chinese citizenship until 1956, when he was forced to accept Vietnamese citizenship. In 1975, he asked for his Chinese citizenship back, but didn't get it. Mr Quang's mother never had need of a passport, so her citizenship was never an issue. The family fled to Hong Kong in October, 1978, and arrived in the United States in March 1979.

Mr. Quang started school in 1965 at the age of six, at a private Chinese elementary school in Qui Nhon. The school had three principals: an administrator from Taiwan, a Vietnamese principal, and a Chinese principal. Schooling was in both Chinese and Vietnamese. In his first and second grades, Mr. Quang learned to read both Chinese characters and the Vietnamese alphabet; in the following four years, subjects were taken from the Vietnamese national curriculum (math and history), and from curricula in schools in Taiwan. The Vietnamese textbooks were those used throughout South Vietnam, and the Chinese textbooks were from Taiwan.

As one of the goals of the school was to establish the use of Mandarin among the pupils, they were expected to speak only Mandarin while at school. Pupils were not punished for speaking Vietnamese or one of the other dialects of Chinese, but "the supervisor talked to you." Mr. Quang found Mandarin relatively easy to learn; now, while he knows Hainanese, he is more comfortable in Mandarin. His Vietnamese is excellent to the point of being indistinguishable from that of ethnic Vietnamese.

The secondary school Mr. Quang attended prepared students for post-secondary work either in Taiwan or in Vietnam; students chose courses depending on where they were headed. Subjects in which students were tested on the Vietnamese baccalaureate examination were taught in Vietnamese; all others - literature, civics, Chinese history, physics, chemistry - were taught in Chinese. English was offered from the beginning (grade 7); French was offered in grades 10 through 12, but only for those

taking the Vietnamese baccalaureate exam. As Mr. Quang expected to continue his education in Vietnam (he did spend some time at a teachers' college before his family left Vietnam), he took the Vietnamese course of study.

B. The Ethnic Chinese Refugees in the United States

By all accounts, the vast majority of Indochinese refugees coming into the United States these days (1979 - 80) have less formal education, and less experience with Western culture, than did the refugees who came in 1975. The ethnic Chinese are the exception.

The 1975 refugee population was skewed in favor of educated people in the three countries involved, as these were the people who had contact with the United States. As political problems and living conditions in the Indochinese countries continue to force people to leave, the rural people - the farmers and fishermen with little or no education - are being represented among the refugees in larger numbers.

The ethnic Chinese refugees entering the U.S. are by and large educated. As we tried to show in the previous section, education has been a matter of concern in the ethnic Chinese communities for centuries. As the Chinese communities have had a "leg up" on the indigenous populations in terms of wealth and contacts with both eastern and western outside worlds, so have their children had advantages in terms of the amount and quality of education available to them. The result of all this is that, on the whole, the ethnic Chinese population is better educated than a parallel indigenous populations; in parallel, the ethnic Chinese refugees are as a group better educated and more sophisticated than other refugee groups.

All this means that the ethnic Chinese refugees are typically in a better position to take advantage of educational programs in the United States that require some background on the part of the students, for example the more extensive skills training programs with relatively stiff entrance requirements, or academic programs leading to AA or BA degrees and beyond. The only handicap the typical ethnic Chinese refugee will have will be his lack of English.

The ethnic Chinese refugees are also, by virtue of their education, better able on the whole to profit from already-existing English language classes offered to foreign students at community colleges and universities. These classes, which are geared in content and pacing to the needs of students who have been fairly well educated in their home countries, are quite appropriate and valuable for the educated ethnic Chinese refugee.

This is not to say, of course, that an illiterate ethnic Chinese farmer will be in a better position to take advantage of these kinds of programs than an illi-

terate Lao farmer; what we are saying is that in a group of ethnic Chinese refugees, there will be more of them able to profit from already-existing educational programs, and correspondingly less need for special English language and skills training programs, than in a parallel group of Indochinese refugees of other ethnic backgrounds.

C. Literacy in Chinese

A good many ethnic Chinese refugees are literate in Chinese. We should point out here that, as the Chinese writing system uses symbols to represent words rather than sounds, it is equally readable no matter what dialect of Chinese the reader speaks. (The same symbol will be pronounced quite differently from dialect to dialect, but will be understood the same.) So, while most of the younger people who are literate in Chinese will speak Mandarin (because they were taught in it in school), it is quite possible that an older Teochiu-speaking refugee will be able to read Chinese newspaper articles, but would not be able to talk to the Cantonese- or Mandarin-speaking authors of the articles.

What literacy in Chinese means for refugees in the United States is that they have available to them all the resources that have been developed in the Chinese communities over the years: the Chinese newspapers published on both coast; magazines; English language learning aids like Chinese-English dictionaries; novels and other entertainment; and so on. While a particular ethnic Chinese refugee might identify himself more with the Vietnamese, Lao or Cambodian refugee community than with the Chinese community already here, there are sources of information available to him in his own language that aren't available to anywhere near the same extent to the other refugee groups.

IV. Sources for Further Reference

In this section, we list, with brief annotations, books and articles that we found were of special interest and help in preparing this Guide.

Nguyen Ngoc Bich. "The Chinese Schools in Vietnam." Paper reproduced by the Midwest Indochinese Material Development Center, 1980.

A discussion of Chinese schools in South Vietnam, with information gathered in interviews with ethnic Chinese refugees in Arlington, Virginia.

Ellis, William S. "Hong Kong's Refugee Dilemma." National Geographic, November, 1979, pp. 709-732.

Picture-essay describing the refugee camp in Hong Kong, and discussing the conditions under which refugees were fleeing Vietnam by sea in the spring and summer of 1979. There's a particularly useful map showing the routes, numbers and destinations of the boat people.

Fall, Bernard B. "Viet-Nam's Chinese problem." Far Eastern Survey, Vol. 27, No. 5 (May, 1958), pp. 65-72.

An article discussing in detail the Diem regime's enforced nationalization of ethnic Chinese in 1956 and its consequences.

Fitzgerald, Stephen. China and the Overseas Chinese: A Study of Peking's Changing Policy. Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1972.

A discussion of the ins and outs of Peking's policy towards the expatriate Chinese, in particular the problem of nationality, education, and the Cultural Revolution.

Hiebert, Murray. "Vietnam's Ethnic Chinese." Southeast Asian Chronicle No. 68 (December 1979), pp. 21-25.

A discussion of the events leading up to the massive exodus of the ethnic Chinese in Spring and Summer 1979. It focuses in particular on the relations between Vietnam and China.

Heidhues, Mary F. Somers. Southeast Asia's Chinese Minorities. Victoria, Australia: Longman, 1974.

A well-written, clear presentation of the Overseas Chinese: demography, diversity, economic life, assimilation and so on. While it does not deal in particular with the Chinese communities in Indochina, it is an excellent source of information in general.

Hunter, Guy. South-East Asia - Race, Culture and Nation. New York: Oxford University Press, 1966.

The chapter on immigrant races includes a discussion of the Overseas Chinese: their culture, education, religion and so on. The chapter on education discusses policies towards the use of languages in schoools.

Karlgren, Bernhard. The Chinese Language - An Essay on Its Nature and History. New York: Ronald Press Company, 1949.

A somewhat dated, but overall accurate and charming presentation of the Chinese language/dialects for the general reader.

Murray, Douglas P. "Chinese Education in South-East Asia." The China Quarterly No 20 (October - December, 1964), pp. 67-95.

A discussion of schools in the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, with particular reference to their influence in helping or hindering assimilation to indigenous societies. Useful statistics are given, especially in comparison to statistics on indigenous given in Noss (annotated below). There are separate sections on Vietnam, and Cambodia and Laos.

Nevadomsky, Joseph-john, and Alice Li. The Chinese in Southeast Asia: A Selected and Annotated Bibliography of Publications in Western Languages, 1960-1970. Berkeley, CA: Center for South and Southeast Asia Studies, University of California, 1970.

The title is self-explanatory. There are separate (short!) sections on Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

Nguyen Khac Vien. "A Letter to Some American Friends." Southeast Asian Chronicle No. 68 (December 1979), pp. 26-28.

An article, taken from the July 1979 issue of Vietnam Courier published in Hanoi, presenting the Vietnamese point of view with regard to China, re-education camps, and the boat people.

Nguyen The Loc. The Chinese in the Republic of Viet-Nam. Unpublished MS thesis, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 1967.

A discussion from the Vietnamese viewpoint of the Chinese communities in Vietnam, outlining the history of migration, the status of the Chinese during the French colonial period, the Chinese influence on Vietnamese nationalization, and questions of assimilation.

Niehaus, Marjorie. "Indochinese Refugee Exodus: Causes, Impact, Prospects." Appendix VI (pp. 135-204) of Refugee Crisis in Cambodia, Serial No. 96-39 (Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, U. S. Senate, October 31, 1979). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980.

A clear account of events leading up to the exodus of the boat people in the spring of 1979, the results of the July 1979 Geneva Conference, and subsequent events. This is a Congressional Research Service report.

Noss, Richard B. Language Policy and Higher Education in Southeast Asia. Consultant's Report, UNESCO-IAU Joint Research Programme in Higher Education. London: Expedite Multiprint Ltd., 1967.

An account of higher education in the Southeast Asian countries, which, in its discussion of minority languages and their use in schools, incidentally sheds light on Chinese education in comparison to indigenous education.

Purcell, Victor. The Chinese in Southeast Asia, 2nd Ed. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.

One of the classic works on the subject, full of fascinating details (you can get a taste of the style from the quotes in section III) and opinions. Part IV is a discussion of the ethnic Chinese in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, and deals with demography, early history, economic roles, relations between China and Indochina, and politics and nationalism.

Quinn-Judge, Paul. "Vietnamese Refugees: Notes on the Origin of the Problem". The Southeast Asia Record Vol. I, No. 27 (December 7-13, 1979), pp. 10-11.

A discussion of events leading to the exodus of the boat people in spring of 1979, with particular focus on the problems of the Vietnamese economy as a crucial factor.

(No Author). On Vietnam's Expulsion of Chinese Residents. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1978.

A collection of addresses, translated into flawless English, given by Chinese government officials at meetings between China and Vietnam to discuss the spring 1978 flow of refugees from Vietnam to China. The Chinese viewpoint regarding the citizenship issue, the currency exchange move, and Vietnam's treatment of the ethnic Chinese is very thoroughly expressed in these addresses.

United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees. "Report on the Indochinese Refugee Program, Geneva, April 1979." Reprinted in The Refugee Act of 1979, S. 643, Serial No. 96-1 (Hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, March 14, 1979.) Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979.

William, Lea E. The Future of the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966.

A very pro-Chinese survey of the then-current situation of the Overseas Chinese population in Southeast Asia, and a discussion of U.S. policy. Includes a selected bibliography of works in English.

Willmott, W.E. "History and Sociology of the Chinese in Cambodia prior to the French Protectorate." Southeast Asian History, Vol VII, No. 1 (March 1966), pp. 15-38

A historical description of Chinese contact with Cambodia from the 1st Century A.D. until French domination in 1864. Includes a comprehensive bibliography.

Willmott, W.E. The Chinese in Cambodia. Vancouver, Canada: University of British Columbia Publications Centre, 1967.

Overall survey of the Chinese community in Cambodia, dealing with ethnic status, economic position, legal status and social organization.

Willmott, W.E. "Congregations and Associations: The Political Structure of the Chinese Community in Phnom-Penh, Cambodia." Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol II, No. 3 (June 1969), pp. 282-301.

A discussion of the political system of the Chinese community in Phnom-Pehn, as compared with parallel communities in Java and Singapore.

Yang, Paul. "Chinese Dialectology 1955-1965." Orbis Vol. XV, No. 1, 1966, pp. 90-15

A survey article on Chinese dialect studies, with annotated bibliographies.